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A UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION IN POST-REUNIFIED KOREA

By

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Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

A UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION IN POST-REUNIFIED KOREA

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the mission and operational impacts of the United States military in a post-reunified Korea. Four different possible scenarios leading to Korean unification are discussed. The four possible scenarios leading to unification are: integration and peaceful unification, collapse and absorption, unification through conflict, and unification by disequilibrium and potential external intervention. The first and second scenarios have German unification comparisons. All of the scenarios describe a mission for the U.S. military. These varied missions are humanitarian aid, refugee support, logistics distribution, Weapons of Mass Destruction dismantling and security (to include chemical or biological weapons depots and plants, and nuclear facilities), and the demobilization of the North Korean military and its major hardware and weapons systems. The operational impacts of these missions vary from using the United States military manpower in theater to a mobilization and deployment of forces from the continental United States.

Introduction

The union of the two Koreas will constitute a strategic change in Northeast Asia. The unification process could go in different ways, which will depend on how political, military, economic, and regional factors come into play. Certainly, peaceful unification will have more manageable problems; whereas, a unification through military conflict would have difficult and violent problems to solve. Regardless of the process, the United States military has a mission in post-reunified Korea. This paper will discuss four possible types of Korean Unification and a United States military mission for each type of unification process. The first scenario will be Korean Unification through integration and peaceful unification. The second scenario will be the collapse of the North Korean government and its absorption by the South Korean government. The third scenario will be Korean Unification through conflict. The final scenario will be unification by disequilibrium and potential external intervention. Each scenario will be described followed by missions required by the United States military.

This paper will discuss the post-unification missions and impact on the United States military in a worst-case basis for each unification scenario. To assess the challenges of the United States military mission one must understand the complete political, military, economic, and social status of North Korea. Due to the closed nature of the North Korean society, objective and concrete information is not available to have a clear view to the complete challenges that will shape the mission of the United States military. Therefore, planning for the worst-case scenario will identify some of the policy and operational challenges that will be faced by military operational planners for each of the four possible unification outcomes to be discussed.

Background

For half a century, the world has grown accustomed to a divided Korea. More than forty-five years after the end of the Korean war, North Korea and South Korea remain in a technical state of war, with the military confrontation between the two states the most heavily armed face-off in the world (1.1 million troops in the North and 680,000 troops in the South). In addition, the United States continues to deploy nearly 37,000 military personnel in Korea for deterrence and defense. Given North Korea's arsenal of ballistic missiles, long-range artillery, and chemical weapons, any outbreak of hostilities on the peninsula is potentially catastrophic, especially in view of Seoul's proximity to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating South Korea and North Korea.¹

From the outside looking in, the Korean peninsula seems frozen in time. Despite the rigid inter-Korean relations driven by North Korean hard line policy, the North's delicate political and economic situation could create dramatic changes on the peninsula. North Korea finds itself cut off from its previous cold war alliances with Russia and China, facing an energy crisis, a declining Gross National Product (GNP), and a food and medicine shortage.² South Korea's economy has grown in a very prosperous rate with stability in its political and social realms. The South Korean GNP in 1953 was \$1.35 billion, in 1994 it was \$376.9 billion. This growth has given the South Koreans world economic credibility and power. South Korea's phenomenal growth has been attributed to such factors as its highly-skilled and educated labor force working at low wages; the

¹ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Press, 1999), 1.

² William J. Taylor, Jr, and Abraham Kim, "The Koreas in the Changing Northeast Region," in Asian Security to the Year 2000: ed. Smith, Diane L. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, December 15, 1996), 23

adoption of foreign technology and capital; an export-led growth strategy; and close state-business relations, which have incurred mammoth political problems.³

The United States national security strategy for the Korean Peninsula is – “to create conditions of stability by maintaining solidarity with our South Korean Ally, emphasizing America’s commitment to shaping a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula, and ensuring that an isolated and struggling North Korea does not opt for a military solution to its political and economic problems. Peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a democratic, non-nuclear, reunified peninsula will enhance peace and security in the East Asia region and is clearly in our strategic interest.”⁴

Scenario 1: Integration and Peaceful Unification

This scenario clearly has two fundamental assumptions: (1) that both the Republic of South Korea (ROK) and the Democratic Peoples Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK), will undertake profound changes in attitudes and assumptions about each other and (2) that a series of interim steps can be instituted that ultimately allow the far larger changes declared under this model.⁵

Assuming that peaceful negotiated unification occurs, the process would, at a minimum, encompass the political, legal, and security components of unification. The political component entails both the ROK and DPRK governments accepting each other as full negotiating partners and equal legal entities prior to negotiations of a mutually binding political settlement. General and specific principles and procedures would have to be formally stated, including the pace of negotiations, the desirability of gradual

³ Ibid., 24.

⁴ The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Wash, D.C.: December, 1999), 35

⁵ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, 50.

integration between the two sides, and specific norms to govern political relations.⁶ Legally, the two countries would have to draft new laws, regulations, and agreements to enable negotiations on a comprehensive structure that covers all aspects of unified governance.⁷ The security component would mean that the 1953 armistice agreement signed between the United States (as head of the United Nations Forces), China, and North Korea would have to be replaced by a permanent peace treaty. A mechanism for collaboration between the militaries of both systems would have to be decided on before any steps toward integration could proceed. The question of the future of the United Nations Command, the Combined Forces Command and other subcommands would have to be addressed as well. As mentioned above, North Korea's military agreements with China and Russia would also require careful review prior to formal unification talks.⁸ This also assumes that the North will choose to drop its long-standing demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South.

A German Unification Comparison

German unification demonstrated that the reunification of a country after a long period of division and difficulties is possible in a peaceful and democratic way. Yet, for as many similarities as there are between the German and Korean unification, there are as many differences. Unlike Germany, North and South Korea fought a ferocious war. The two Germanys, unlike the two Koreas, concluded a system of treaties to normalize relations at the official level and to secure a fraction of civil contacts and communications among the people. On the Korean peninsula, North Korea has remained a hermetically closed society until the last couple of years. Little or no information flows uncontrolled

⁶ Ibid., 51

⁷ Ibid., 52

⁸ Ibid., 52

into the country, access to foreign radio and television broadcasts is non-existent, and until recently, no contact was permitted with the outside world.⁹ In the past year there have been family reunions and the North and South Korean Olympic athletes walked together in the opening ceremony at the 2000 Summer Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia.

There are no significant differences in the economic constellation between Germany and Korea. As discussed earlier in this paper the North's GNP is significantly lower than that of the South. The South's continued economic growth has widened the per capita income gap to at least five times that of the North. In 1993 the North Korean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was 16% of South Korea, while East German GDP was 25% of West Germany's at the time of unification.¹⁰ Other differences that make a significant impact are the severe shortage of goods (grains, rice, medicine, etc.) and access to raw materials in North Korea. In general, South Korea does not have the capacity to bear the full cost of unification and might need to resort to higher domestic taxation and external borrowing on a large scale. Furthermore, South Korea is not in a position to offer generous aid programs to other countries in exchange for their support for reunification.¹¹

A U.S. Military Mission after Peaceful Unification

For the U.S. military, peaceful unification would call for a small mission with only a few military risks. Long-term security arrangements for the peninsula would be

⁹ Helmut Schmidt, Chair of a Report on the Conclusions and Recommendations by a High-level Expert Group on The Lessons of the German Unification Process for Korea, Inter Action Council. (Paris, France: 17-18 February 1993), 5 <http://www.asiawide.or.jp/iac/meetings/Eng93germany.htm> [6 January 2001]

¹⁰ Ibid., 5

¹¹ Ibid., 6

worked out in political negotiations between the two Koreas. However, post-unification security planning could be handled through U.S.-ROK channels.

The U.S. military mission in this scenario could entail the handling of refugees, logistics, and security of pilferable locations storing food, medicine, and other essentials. The military would be heavily involved in dealing with thousands of refugees from the North looking to improve their well-being. The North's economy, as discussed earlier, will cause the refugees to move away from hunger and poverty. The movement of supplies (humanitarian assistance) and refugees will tax the military and civilian transportation assets bringing a need for roadway assessment and traffic control. While a unified Korea tries to get on its feet economically, the U.S. military has a mission to aid in the dismantling and security of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to ensure orderly progress is being made to ensure the country is stable and capable of handling its own nation rebuilding.

The operational impacts on the U.S. military for this scenario would most likely include a small deployment of combat support and combat service support units from Japan, Okinawa and CONUS. The deployed units could come from the active forces with civil affairs units coming from the reserve forces. This deployment from CONUS could be small, the U.S. forces in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa could handle the majority of the mission.

Scenario 2: Collapse and Absorption

The definition of collapse is the inability of the regime in power to maintain effective political, economic, social, and military control, which ultimately leads to its dissolution; and, in the extreme case, the formal end of the state. Three variations to

consider are: (1) a collapse that results in dissolution of the ruling regime, with a successor regime managing to retain political and military control; (2) a collapse where political instability is rampant and where the successor regime is unable to establish or retain effective governing authority led either by the party, the bureaucracy, or the military; and (3) a collapse that could precipitate some type of conflict –internally in the form of limited military clashes with existing governing authorities or externally in terms of border clashes with the South or more extensive military operations directed against the ROK.¹²

In examples two and three above, the North Korean People's Army (KPA) leadership, fractured and left no central control, could cause division into rival units, each having political and territorial control over specific areas of the country and each with control over particular weapons systems. This situation would carry an inherent risk of internal violence with the latent potential for spillover consequences.¹³

Another example of scenarios two and three would be that the North Korean military would follow orders to attack south, if told to do so. In desperation, feeling isolated, paranoid, wracked by the “bunker mentality” to take the last grasp at victory or go down buttressed by possession of one or two deliverable nuclear weapons, the DPRK might order an attack south with conventional weapons, take Seoul, halt and sue for peace (in the belief that their nuclear weapons would deter a counterattack). To make it worse they might even use the nuclear weapons as a final act of insanity.¹⁴

¹² Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, 59.

¹³Ibid., 58

¹⁴ William J. Taylor, Jr, and Abraham Kim, “The Koreas in the Changing Northeast Region,” in Asian Security to the Year 2000: 27

A German Unification Comparison

The German model provides useful comparison and historical analogy, but there are several differences between the collapse of East Germany and the possible collapse of North Korea. The German unification had started in 1972 when the two Germanys agreed to simultaneous recognition. This allowed for full diplomatic relations and fairly normal political relations for nearly two decades prior to unification. The Korean countries until the summer of 2000 had no formal talks between heads of state for over 50 years.¹⁵

When the East German governing structure collapsed in 1990, the possibility of any armed hostilities between the Warsaw Pact and NATO had virtually ceased. This is not the case in North Korea. The loss of governing structure in North Korea would create immediate risks of armed conflict, either within or across the North's borders. This would certainly find the U.S. military immediately involved in hostilities.¹⁶

The difference in the governing powers between East Germany and North Korea is that unification through military means was never a strategy of the East German government. The East German Army was incapable of operating independently of Soviet military command. The North Korean military is very capable of working independent of Soviet or Chinese military command.

A U.S. Military Mission after Collapse and Absorption

Seoul fears that a huge migration would occur after a collapse of communist power as North Korean refugees sought to escape hunger and poverty. As one South Korean economist commented, "Imagine what would happen if even a thousand North

¹⁵ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,
57

¹⁶ Ibid., 58

Korean refugees came and camped on the banks of the Han River....We couldn't handle it."¹⁷

The U.S. military would have to be prepared for a wide range of missions in this scenario of collapse and absorption. The missions could entail armed conflict, refugee and humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, WMD dismantling and security, demobilization of the North Korean military and cleanup and rebuilding of key infrastructure facilities damaged in conflict or aggression.

A priority goal would be to ensure internal stability within North Korea and to avoid any spillover of instability into the South. If stability cannot be maintained, peace operations would have to initially be undertaken by ROK forces mobilized into North Korea, assuming they could enter without resistance. Tasks for the U.S. military would be WMD dismantling and security, to include chemical or biological weapons depots and plants, and nuclear facilities. The demobilization of the North's military and its major hardware and weapons systems would require major efforts by Combined Forces Command (CFC) units, possibly augmented by additional forces deployed to the peninsula. Military activities in the Northern half of the peninsula would have to be predicated on prior political agreement reached among Japan, Korea, Russia, and China.¹⁸

The operational impacts on the U.S. military for this scenario would likely be a large deployment of forces from CONUS. These forces would come from both active and reserve components, capable of performing humanitarian aid tasks, peacekeeping,

¹⁷ Eui-gak Hwang, The Korean Economies: A Comparison of North and South, (Oxford, Great Britain: Clarendon Press, 1993), 194

¹⁸ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, 96

and possible combat actions. This mission could easily more than double or triple the size of forces currently on the Korean peninsula.

Scenario 3: Unification Through Conflict

There are a number of military contingencies that could occur in Korea. The scenario that the United States has contemplated is a full North Korean offensive against South Korea. This is the worst-case scenario for the U.S. military mission planners to contemplate and prepare for of the four scenarios discussed in this paper. In the last few years, most of the U.S. military analysis of the Korean peninsula standoff has focused on the North Korean offensive as described in former Secretary of Defense, Les Aspen's report "The Bottom-Up Review." This analysis assumed a short-notice scenario in which North Korea attacked with an armor-heavy combined arms force. The U.S. forces in the region would have to delay the invasion while waiting for additional forces to be deployed into the peninsula.¹⁹

North Korean strategic objectives during unification through conflict would be to:

- (1) project an offensive force to occupy South Korea and reach Pusan prior to additional U.S. forces arriving at its port, (2) deter US involvement in a Korean conflict or to induce the U.S. to terminate involvement, (3) coerce Japan into denying the United States a base of operations for its air forces, naval forces, and logistical support, (4) seek international support and recognition of the North Korean efforts and conquest, especially from China and Russia.²⁰

In 1950, the North Koreans achieved surprise and rapidly destroyed much of the ROK Army, but they did not exploit in depth with dispatch, a key failure that allowed the

¹⁹ Bruce W. Bennett, Two Alternative Views of War in Korea: The North and South Korean Revolutions in Military Affairs, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995), 2

²⁰ Ibid., 7

ROK Army to reorganize and hold with the aid of U.S. forces.²¹ If the DPRK could achieve surprise with great amounts of firepower, the estimated damage on Seoul would be enormous and the casualty estimates would range from 52,000 U.S. troops to 490,000 ROK troops and an untold number of civilian casualties.²² This would put the South in a state of panic and confusion, causing a large refugee problem, looting, road congestion, and logistical problems for the ROK/U.S. military.

The DPRK's 1.1 million man active military with 4.7 million man reserve is the fourth largest army in the world. The ROK has a 670,000 man active military and 4.5 million man reserve with an additional 37,000 US troops making up the CFC. When looking at the DPRK forces, defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon says, "a significant reduction in field training in recent years and doubts over the availability of fuel, spare parts and other supplies are the coup de grace; any DPRK attack would almost certainly end in disaster."²³ In January 1998, DIA Director General Patrick Hughes testified to Congress that "North Korea's overall military readiness continues to erode in line with its worsening economic situation."²⁴ Even though the DPRK military is eroding they would be able to initially inflict a great deal of damage to South Korea.

Considering all of these factors discussed, it is clear that the DPRK cannot win an offensive against the South employing only conventional forces. Developments in South Korea have strengthened South Korean defenses, making it likely that ground defenses in front of Seoul will hold; even if they did not, South Korean and U.S. air forces would

²¹ Ibid., 11

²² Robert Eidsmoe, Reconciliation for the Korean Peninsula. (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 20 May 1999), 6

²³ Ibid., 5

²⁴ Ibid., 5

destroy North Korean mechanized exploitation forces in a war limited to conventional weapons.²⁵

A U.S. Military Mission after Conflict

The primary missions for the US military after unification through conflict would be peacekeeping, refugee support, humanitarian aid, WMD dismantling and security, to include chemical or biological weapons depots and plants, and nuclear facilities, the demobilization of the North's military and its major hardware and weapons systems, and aid to the Korean government in reestablishing control over the entire peninsula. In northern Korea, martial law would have to be enforced until suitable civil/governmental agencies could take over and be established. Infrastructure assessment and logistical engineering would also be a part of governmental aid provided to the new Korean government.

The operational impacts on the U.S. military for this scenario would be a large deployment of forces from CONUS. Most forces would have been mobilized and deployed for the conflict, those forces necessary for the mission after the conflict would remain on, or be deployed to, the Korean peninsula. The U.S. forces deployed would be from both the active and reserve components capable of completing all missions stated earlier.

Scenario 4: Disequilibrium and Potential External Intervention

This scenario is dominated by events that lead to “gray outcomes.” For example, if a regime collapse occurs in the North and a successor government is in power but unable to address daunting economic problems, how should the ROK and the United

²⁵ Bruce W. Bennett, Two Alternative Views of War in Korea: The North and South Korean Revolutions in Military Affairs, 2

States deal with a weakened, but not collapsing, DPRK government? Another example could be, if North Korea, on the verge of collapse, requests and receives political and military assistance from China. Assuming that China extends support to the North in addition to explicit signals that it will not remain passive in the event of impending meltdown in the North, what political objectives should the United States and the ROK pursue?²⁶

Based on these two possibilities in this scenario, the United States and ROK have several political consequences to handle. At present, China is contributing more substantial food and energy aid to the North than it did in the first half of the 1990s, with Beijing and Pyongyang both making public reference to some of this assistance. The aid given to the DPRK is not enough to revitalize the North's economy, but it does bring the question of whether there are circumstances that would lead the Chinese to undertake a larger economic revitalization role in the weakened DPRK.²⁷

The present day conditions in the region put China in a much stronger position to act than ever throughout history. The neutralization of Russia and Japan, the North Korean hostility toward any active U.S. involvement, and the questionable ability of the ROK government to act effectively in a timely manner to forestall rapid internal destabilization in North Korea, make Russia, Japan, and South Korea unlikely candidates for the task. China's status as North Korea's closest ally, the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Assistance and Defense Treaty, and her powerful economic and military

²⁶ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,

⁷⁵

²⁷ Ibid., 76

capabilities provide the substantive (legal and physical) wherewithal for China to quickly intervene in, and stabilize any North Korean implosion scenario.²⁸

China at this point can pursue two avenues in this scenario. The first would be to dissuade the ROK and the United States from direct involvement in the North, and convey that if the DPRK collapses, the ROK and the United States should not deploy military personnel north of the 38th parallel.²⁹ Feasible Chinese objectives would be to (1) preserve the status quo on the peninsula, maintaining the Korean buffer to the Chinese border, (2) forestall any violent destabilization that would lead to military conflict on the Korean peninsula and (3) establish a moderate, pro-Chinese government in North Korea capable of implementing needed economic reforms.³⁰ The second option the Chinese may opt for, is to accelerate its cooperation and communication with the United States and South Korea, enabling all three states to manage an endgame crisis in the north, while simultaneously reducing the risk of misperception or an overt clash of interests among them.³¹

If China decided against a direct intervention, it would nonetheless seek to ensure that any U.S. forces deployed in Korea after unification would remain below the 38th parallel, and that major U.S. strategic assets were not maintained on the peninsula. Alternatively, China could seek to coax South Korea into signing a friendship treaty in return for China's implicit support for unification under ROK auspices while seeking to

²⁸ Steve A. Foncadero, An Alternative Scenario for the Reunification of Korea, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), 17

²⁹ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, 77

³⁰ Steve A. Foncadero, An Alternative Scenario for the Reunification of Korea, 17

³¹ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung M. Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, 77

limit the scope of future ROK-U.S. security collaboration.³² China has much to gain and few if any incentives to remain passive in this scenario.

This scenario is good reason for the United States and South Korea to strengthen relations with China. A strong relationship between the United States and China is critical in this scenario. Establishing now, an agreement of policy on the reunification of Korea, will pay dividends in this scenario as well as other scenarios.

A U.S. Military Mission After External Intervention

In this scenario the U.S. military mission is dependent on the level of Chinese involvement. If China denies U.S. military presence above the 38th parallel, (and the U.S. complies to the demand) but allows ROK presence, the U.S. military mission would be logistical support to the ROK military, humanitarian aid, refugee support, and WMD dismantling and security expertise to the ROK. If China allows U.S. military presence north of the 38th parallel the mission will be very similar to scenarios one and two. The U.S. forces will be drawn down to a much smaller number with a mission to be defined through political negotiations.

The operational impacts of this scenario on U.S. forces would be similar to the impacts of scenario one. Depending on Chinese involvement, it is possible that the U.S. military currently on the Korean peninsula could handle the mission.

Post-Unified Korea Challenges

Following the unification of the Korean peninsula, the relations between the United States and the new Korea will be friendly, but will rely less on the United States for security. This will cause friction in trade and differences in foreign affairs. The United States and a new Korea will have diplomatic problems that will have to be

³² Ibid., 80

managed to maintain friendly relations and alliances. Japan and the new Korea will be competitive in all aspects. The new Korean economy as time passes will have the potential to become a far greater economy than Japan, making Korea a heavier economic counterweight in the Northeast Asian region. This will cause friction and competition between Japan and Korea.³³

If current reform and open door policies in China and Russia continue, it is expected that relations between a unified Korea, China, and Russia will strengthen their mutual economic cooperation, even if they act as a check on each other with regard to security issues. Because Korean unification is viewed as a catalyst for a new set of international relationships in Northeast Asia, a unified Korea will be required to engage in skillful diplomacy and to be more prudent than ever toward the other nations in the region.³⁴

Conclusion

A U.S. military mission in post-reunified Korea will take on a much different role than the mission of today. Depending on the scenario that leads to the reunification, the U.S. military could take on a leading role from stabilization and progression to supporting and technical advising. The flexibility of the U.S. military would be key to providing capabilities to meet the challenges that would accompany the political, economic, social, and infrastructure rebuilding of the north, and any damage that may occur in the south from potential conflict.

The time to plan for the reunification of Korea is now. The four scenarios discussed all require planning for future missions that require the evaluation of

³³ Young-Kyu Park, "Post-Unification Challenges," Korean Unification: Implications for Northeast Asia, ed. Amos A. Jordan, (Wash. D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 44

³⁴ Ibid., 44

operational impacts on the U.S. military. Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China must be strengthened, and a policy on Korean reunification establishing the roles and involvement of Russia, Japan, China, and the United States.

The four scenarios discussed all lead to a mission and the operational impact for the U.S. military for a varied period of time after reunification. All missions had humanitarian and refugee support, WMD dismantling and security, peace operations, and assisting with the demobilization of the North Korean military. The operational impacts vary from using the current forces on the peninsula to a large mobilization and deployment of the active and reserve forces. All of the missions will require a greater number of logistical forces that can transport and distribute support by air and ground. These units and their missions must be identified. Another U.S. challenge will be to explore multinational peninsula security for peacekeeping. The continual presence of the U.S. military and its mission in reunified Korea cannot be fully known or resolved in advance but must be managed in a pragmatic, step-by-step fashion.³⁵ By starting the planning now, for an event as important as this, will put the military in a very good position for the military mission after Korean unification.

³⁵ Gerrit W. Gong, "Korean Unification: Implications for the United States and Northeast Asia," Korean Unification: Implications for Northeast Asia, ed. Amos A. Jordan, (Wash. D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 119

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